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We use a dependent competing risks hazard rate model to investigate individual 
sickness absence behaviour in Norway, on the basis of register data covering more 
than 2 million absence spells. Our findings are: i) that business cycle improvements 
yield lower work-resumption rates for persons who are absent, and higher relapse rates 
for persons who have already resumed work; ii) that absence sometimes represents a 
health investment, in the sense that longer absence ‘now’ reduces the subsequent 
relapse propensity; and iii) that the work-resumption rate increases when sickness 
benefits are exhausted, but that work-resumptions at this point tend to be short-lived.  
    2
1  Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate how the economic environment affects 
worker absenteeism, with a focus on the design of the health insurance system and 
state of the business cycle (labour market tightness). We take advantage of a unique 
Norwegian database (The Frisch Centre Database) containing a complete account of 
absence spells due to sickness (lasting at least two weeks) in Norway during the 1992-
1999 period. In total, the data contain more than two million absence spells. These 
data make it possible to establish duration specific work-resumption rates and subse-
quent relapse rates, and to investigate the extent to which these rates are related to la-
bour market developments and to institutional aspects of the health insurance system.   
Our methodological approach is based on a hazard rate framework. We set up 
a comprehensive (grouped) dependent competing risks hazard rate model, in which 
we not only seek to explain the first transition into either work-resumption or (more 
lasting) insurance schemes such as rehabilitation and disability; we also account for 
the subsequent relapse hazard and the potentiality of later (delayed) transitions into 
rehabilitation/disability. There is stochastic dependence between the various hazard 
rates, arising from the presence of unobserved heterogeneity; e.g. in the form that per-
sons with unobserved characteristics that yield a low work-resumption hazard also 
tend to have unobserved characteristics that yield a high relapse hazard once work is 
actually resumed. We model the multivariate distribution of unobserved characteris-
tics in a non-parametric fashion, in order to ensure a maximum degree of data-based 
(as opposed to assumption-based) inference.  
Norway ranks among the countries of the world with the most generous sick-
pay scheme. The fact that it also ranks among the countries with the highest fraction 
of working days lost due to illness (CESifo, 2002) illustrates a possible moral hazard   3
dilemma. In the face of high replacement ratios, some workers may be tempted to reg-
ister as sick even though they are able to work
1. This kind of behaviour may take dif-
ferent forms, from outright shirking, to just a slight bias in the assessment of one’s 
own health condition. There is an existing literature that evaluates the relationship be-
tween the level of sickness benefits and individual absenteeism. This literature dem-
onstrates convincingly that sickness absence is not always a clear-cut response to a 
medical condition, but that the level of compensation does play an important role (see 
Barmby et al., 2002, for a recent overview). Given the rarity of exogenous variation in 
sickness benefits, the most recent contributions to the literature have tried to take ad-
vantage of institutional reforms that have imposed some kind of changes in the incen-
tive structures. For example, Meyer et al. (1995) compare individuals injured before 
and after increases in the maximum benefit amount in two American states (with per-
sons below the initial maximum serving as controls), and find that the elasticity of 
‘time out of work’ with respect to the benefit level was around 0.3-0.4 in these cases. 
Johansson and Palme (2002) take advantage of the sickness insurance reform that was 
implemented in Sweden in 1991, which implied a dramatic decrease in replacement 
ratios, and also find significant disincentive effects.  
In our own data, there is no independent variation in the sizes of sickness 
benefits, since virtually all workers receive a full replacement of their normal income. 
However, after 12 months of absence, this benefit is no longer available, and alterna-
tive benefits (such as rehabilitation or disability) provide much lower replacement; 
hence in cases of long-term absence, it is possible to investigate the consequences of 
                                                 
1 The lack of sickness insurance may also be inefficient, since each work may not take into ac-
count the damage they can inflict on other workers (or customers) if they show up on the work-place 
with infectious diseases, or diseases that seriously reduce the quality of their work (Chatterji and Tilley, 
2002). 
   4
quite substantial changes in economic incentives. Moreover, there are other more sub-
tle sources of variation in the cost of being absent from work that are clearly exoge-
nous from the viewpoint of individuals. In particular, we expect the cost of being ab-
sent to be inversely related to business cycle developments. The reason for this is that 
the cost of being absent (and in particular the cost of being caught ‘shirking’) is 
higher the more insecure a job is considered to be and the more difficult it is to get a 
new one
2 (Barmby et al., 1994). As a result, we expect sickness propensity to decline 
in bad times. The problem with confronting this idea directly with data is that ob-
served absence behaviour may also be affected by labour market tightness through 
two other channels, which are not directly linked to economic incentives. First, labour 
market tightness may affect the degree of strain/stress felt by each worker, and 
thereby their actual medical condition. And second, labour market tightness may af-
fect the selection of workers into employment, since the healthiest workers are likely 
to have the most stable attachment to the labour force. The latter of these effects is a 
pure selection mechanism, which does not require that individual absence behaviour 
is affected by business cycles at all. 
Attempts to disentangle causality from selection in the observed pro-cyclical 
absence pattern in Norway have been based on two different scientific approaches. 
First, Askildsen et al. (2002) focus on the absence behaviour of individuals that are 
employed throughout the business cycle. They find that the positive correlation be-
tween sickness absence and business cycles remains, and conclude that the correlation 
                                                 
2 A more direct approach to investigate the role of job insecurity is to compare absence behaviour 
for persons with secure (permanent) and insecure (temporary) jobs. The problem with this approach is 
of course that the selection into secure and insecure jobs is not random. Based on Swedish data, Arai 
and Thoursie (2001) try to solve this endogeneity problem by focusing on industry/region absence 
time-series aggregates, and regress these on the fraction of temporary employment. Again, the exis-
tence of a causal effect is confirmed. 
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pattern therefore cannot be entirely driven by selection. Second, Dyrstad and Ose 
(2002) separate causality and selection on the basis of the identifying assumption (for 
which they provide some theoretical justification) that selection effects are relatively 
more important when the rate of unemployment is low, while discipline effects are 
relatively more important when the rate of unemployment is high. They find that dis-
cipline effects do have a role to play. More surprisingly, they also find that these ef-
fects are particularly important for longer absence spells. This may suggest that per-
sons with poor health, and hence a potential for having long periods of absence from 
work, are particularly afraid of losing their jobs in bad times.   
In the present paper, we isolate the causal effects of business cycle develop-
ments on work-resumption prospects for ongoing absence spells, by conditioning on 
the state of the business cycle at the moment of entry into sickness absence. Con-
versely, by looking at the ‘effects’ on work-resumption prospects of business cycles at 
the moment of entry, conditioned on the business cycle at the time of potential work-
resumption, we also (indirectly) shed light on the business cycle selection process. 
Our main finding is that there are substantial causal effects of business cycle devel-
opments on work-resumption rates. But, although we are able to eliminate all selec-
tion effects, we cannot without further assumptions decompose the causal relationship 
into discipline and ‘work-pressure’ effects. However, as we explain later on, we inter-
pret the totality of our findings as indicative of all the mechanisms discussed above 
being present, selection effects, discipline effects and work-pressure effects.  
The next section describes the data, and the economic environment in which 
the data were generated. Section 3 sets up the statistical model and discusses identifi-
cation issues. Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 summarises the main 
conclusions.    6
2  Data, Institutions and Business Cycles 
The Norwegian sickness insurance system is generous. The replacement ratio is nor-
mally 100 per cent from the first day of absence
3. But spells lasting more than three 
days (i.e. all spells analysed in the present paper) require a medical certificate. The 
maximum duration of sickness benefits is one year, and at least six months of work 
are required in order to be eligible for a new one-year-period. After that, a 100 per 
cent replacement ratio is no longer an option. The person must then either resume 
work, enrol into some kind of rehabilitation program, or apply for disability benefits. 
The latter option usually requires that rehabilitation has been tried first.  Rehabilita-
tion- and disability benefits typically provide replacement ratios between 50 and 60 
per cent. 
One possible effect of duration-limited sickness benefits is that the duration 
limit becomes a sort of focal point, both for the patient and the doctor, in the sense 
that the patient is ‘allowed’ to consider himself sick until the time of benefit exhaus-
tion. In that case, we would observe an increase in the work resumption rate around 
the time of benefit exhaustion. If absence spells were unaffected by the insurance sys-
tem, and only driven by medical factors, there would be no reason to expect such an 
increase.  
  The data we use in the present analysis are collected from Social Security reg-
isters, and contain monthly observations of all absence spells in Norway (lasting at 
least two weeks) during the 1992-1999 period for persons below 60 years. We trace 
each spell until it ends in either work resumption or in some alternative (and more 
                                                 
3 This is paid by the employers the first two weeks, after which Social Security covers the cost up 
to a ceiling of around 40,000 Euro per year, while employers (in most cases) adds the amount neces-
sary to ensure a 100 per cent replacement ratio.   7
lasting) form of Social Security benefit (rehabilitation or disability
4). In the case of 
work-resumption, we trace the person for the next 12 months as well, in order to iden-
tify relapses into absence spells or subsequent (delayed) transitions to rehabilita-
tion/disability.  If a relapse occurs within the first six months after an absence spell 
was completed, the patient is not entitled to a new benefit period; hence from an ad-
ministrative point of view, the new spell is a continuation of the previous spell.  In the 
terminology used in this paper, such continuation spells belong to the same ‘spell se-
quence’, together with the intervening work-resumption spells. Hence, a new spell 
sequence can only be started after at least six months of work without any recorded 
sickness. A spell sequence is terminated (censored) when one of the following six 
events occur: i) work has been resumed for an uninterrupted period of one year; ii) a 
new sickness spell is recorded after 6-12 months of work resumption; iii) a transition 
to rehabilitation or disability is recorded; iv) the person become 60 years of age; v) 
the person dies; or vi) the observation period has come to an end.  
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Men  Women 
Number of individuals  439,509 567,739 
    
Absence spells:    
Total number  865,016  1,246,347 
Out of which ended in (per cent):     
Work resumption   90.66  91.73 
Rehabilitation, disability or other benefits  5.52  4.58 
Censored at the end of the observation period  3.81  3.68 
Average duration  (months, including censored spells)  3.00  3.05 
    
Work resumption spells:    
Total number  784,245  1,138,898 
Out of which ended in (per cent)     
Relapse into absence within 6 months  16.75  18.43 
Relapse into absence after 6-12 months  12.62  13.18 
Rehabilitation/disability within 6 months  2.06  2.06 
                                                 
4 The reason why we do not distinguish between rehabilitation and disability is that most disabil-
ity transitions are preceded by rehabilitation attempts. Indeed, Norwegian Social Security regulations 
imply that rehabilitation is to be considered before a disability pension can be provided. Since this may 
sometimes be a lengthy process, we are not able to identify the outcome of all the rehabilitation spells 
that we observe.   8
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Rehabilitation/disability after 6-12 months  0.33  0.33 
Censored within 12 months  12.40  12.35 
Resumption spell lasting at least 12 months  55.84  53.65 
    
Total number of spell sequences  805,861  1,153,848 
Fraction of individuals with multiple spell sequences  45.02  53.23 
    
 
Table 1 provides some essential statistics regarding the data. A little more than 
1 million individuals experienced at least one recorded absence spell during the whole 
eight-year period. Around 90 per cent of these spells ended in work-resumption
5. But 
more than 30 per cent of these work-resumptions were short-lived, in the sense that a 
new absence spell started within the first year. The observation period was character-
ised by relatively large changes in labour market tightness. This is illustrated in Figure 
1, where we have plotted two business cycle indicators; the deviation from the esti-
mated trend in the quarterly GDP level (collected from Statistics Norway, see 
Johansen and Eika, 2000), and the estimated human-capital-adjusted monthly transi-
tion rate from unemployment to employment (collected from Gaure and Røed, 2003). 
Both series reveal a deep recession during 1992, after which a steady recovery took 
over. From the autumn of 1996 and two years onwards, Norway’s economy boomed, 
after which a new slow-down emerged.  
 
                                                 
5 Note that we do not actually observe work-resumption; rather we infer that work-resumption has 
occurred when sickness benefits are terminated without being replaced by other kinds of benefits. This 
induces an element of measurement error in our work-resumption indicator. We may erroneously infer 
that work-resumption has occurred in cases were workers pull out of the labour market without reha-
bilitation –or disability benefits. This is the main why we have restricted the analysis to persons below 
60 years of age (and hence well below the age-floor in the most common early retirement schemes). 
   9
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Figure 1. Business cycle developments in Norway 1992.1-1999.12 
3  Identification and Estimation of Causal Effects 
The statistical model we use is a dependent competing risks hazard rate model with 
two alternative origin states – absence (a) and work resumption (w) - and three alter-
native destination states - absence (a), work resumption (w) and rehabilita-
tion/disability (r). The way we construct the dataset ensures that the first origin state 
in each spell sequence is sickness absence. Let i be the subscript over individuals, j 
the subscript over origin states, and k the subscript over destination states. Let d de-
note process time (i.e. spell duration) and let t denote calendar time. The four hazard 
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The hazard rates can approximately be interpreted as the probabilities of making a 
particular transition in a very short time interval starting at duration d and calendar   10
time t, given that no transitions occurred before that point in time. Since we observe 
state occupation on a discrete time basis, we set up the statistical model in terms of 
discrete (grouped) hazard rates. Let  ij t be the calendar time at which individual i en-
tered into the current state j. The grouped composite hazard, i.e. the probability of ex-
iting to one of the two other states during duration period d, given that no exit oc-
curred before that, is given as 
(2)    
1
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For absence spells, we use months as the unit of measurement, while for work-
resumption spells we use quarters. We assume for simplicity that the hazard rates are 
constant within observed time intervals. We also assume that the hazard rates belong 
to the Mixed Proportional Hazards (MPH) family, i.e. they are proportional in factors 
depending on observed covariates (xit), calendar time (t), spell duration (d), destina-
tion specific unobserved scalar variables ( ikt v ) and (in the case of work resumption 
spells) the duration of the last absence spell ( ia d ).  We can then write the integrated 
hazard functions ( ) 1 (, )
d
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where  (.) jk β , (.) jk σ , (.) jk λ and (.) wk γ are functions which parameters are to be recov-
ered from the data.  In (3), the effects of unobserved heterogeneity vary freely over 
time for each individual. Without further restrictions it is of course not possible to 
identify the model. We assume that the unobserved heterogeneity terms can be de-
composed into factors that depend on time only, and factors that depend on the iden-  11
tity of the individual (and remain fixed over time for each individual). More precisely, 
we assume that 
(4)  () ikt k ia ik vt v δ = + , 
where  ia t is the calendar time of entry into the current spell sequence and  (.) k δ  is a 
function. The rational behind letting the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity de-
pend on the calendar time at entry into absence consists of three parts (conf. the intro-
duction): First, business cycle developments may affect the extent to which a given 
medical condition is viewed by the individual as justifying an absence spell. Second, 
the business cycle may directly affect the medical condition of some people through 
its impact on the working pressure (strain and stress). And third, the business cycle 
may affect the composition of the labour force. 
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where ct is the value of the labour market tightness indicator
6 (see Figure 1) in period 
t and  m ψ is a season-parameter. Furthermore, we assume that individual heterogeneity 
and business cycles have the same proportional effects on the rehabilitation/disability 
hazard regardless of the initial state, i.e. 
(6)  11 22 1 1 22 , ,  ,  , . ar wr ar wr ar wr ar wr ar wr β βσ σ σ σ δ δ δ δ = === =  
                                                 
6 We have also estimated the model with the GDP-based business cycle indicator depicted in Fig-
ure 1, but this did not lead to any substantial changes in the results.   12
According to this specification, there are no restrictions at all regarding the spell dura-
tion effects (or the effects of past sickness duration on the subsequent work resump-
tion spell), since a separate parameter is attributed to each possible ongoing (or com-
pleted) duration. The calendar time effects, however, are restricted to depend linearly 
on the level- and difference of a business cycle indicator and on the season. The moti-
vation for including both the level and the difference of the business cycle indicator as 
time varying covariates in the hazard rates(in the jk σ terms) is that both these variables 
convey important information about the expected costs associated with remaining ab-
sent or relapsing into absence. Our prior expectation is that both variables have nega-
tive effects on the work-resumption hazard and positive effects on the relapse hazard. 
The reason for including the same two variables’ values at the time of entry into ab-
sence in the selection function (in the  jk δ terms) is of a similar kind. If a low absence 
cost is associated with less serious illnesses being recorded as sickness, we expect that 
the two business cycle variables contribute to a positive selection effect. However, the 
level of the business cycle will also capture possible negative labour force composi-
tion effects, since the health status of the labour force may be poorer as more marginal 
workers are pulled into the labour market. Hence, we expect that the change in the 
business cycle contribute to a positive selection into the state of absence (in terms of 
higher work-resumption hazards and lower relapse hazards), but that the level of the 
cycle may have a positive or a negative effect, depending on the importance of labour 
force selection.  
A common problem in duration analyses is to disentangle the effects of spell 
duration (duration dependence) from the influences of unobserved heterogeneity. The 
source of this difficulty is that persons that are, for example, only mildly hit by a dis-
ease will tend to resume work quickly, leaving behind persons with more serious dis-  13
eases. And since the seriousness of the disease cannot be observed, this implies that – 
conditional on everything that can be observed – there tends to be a negative correla-
tion between spell duration and work-resumption prospects even when there is no 
causal relationship at all between duration and work-resumption prospects. It has 
been proved, however, that the MPH model of the type we use is non-parametrically 
identified under some regularity assumptions, given that there is at least some cross-
sectional variation in observed explanatory variables that affect the hazard rates in 
question (Elbers and Ridder, 1982; Heckman and Singer, 1984a). The intuition is that 
the ‘selection consequences’ associated with a given value of an unobserved covariate 
depends on the corresponding values of the observed covariates in a manner that can 
be traced out from the proportionality assumption. In our data, there are also two 
sources of information that can be used to disentangle true duration dependence from 
unobserved heterogeneity without reliance on proportionality. The first is the exis-
tence of repeat spell sequences for the same individuals. Since we assume the unob-
served covariates  ik v  to be constant for each individual, this introduces a powerful 
fixed-effect type source of model identification (Van den Berg, 2001).  The second 
source of identification is the existence of time varying covariates (McCall, 1994; 
Brinch, 2000). The basic idea is that persons who according to observed covariates 
have experienced, say, a high probability of work-resumption earlier in their absence 
spell without actually resuming work, have revealed a low expected value of their un-
observed work-resumption propensity, ceteris paribus. An important reservation re-
garding these sources of identification of unobserved heterogeneity is that they only 
identify heterogeneity that has a constant effect at the individual level on the various 
hazard rates. We cannot identify unobserved heterogeneity in the degree of duration 
dependence itself, i.e. in the way e.g. recovery prospects change over spell duration.   14
Given that different types of health problems are associated, not only with different 
recovery prospects as such, but also with different recovery profiles over time, we 
suspect that the influences of unobserved heterogeneity cannot be entirely removed 
from our estimates of spell duration effects. 
We now turn to the estimation of the model, based on observations of explana-
tory variables and transitions. We use a non-parametric approach to account for unob-
served heterogeneity also, to make sure that the results are really driven by the data 
and not by unjustified restrictions. In practice, this implies that the unobserved vari-
ables vik are discretely distributed (Lindsay, 1983) with the number of mass-points 
chosen by adding points until it is no longer possible to increase the likelihood func-
tion (Heckman and Singer, 1984b). Let  it K be the set of feasible transition states for 
individual i at time t and let  itk y be an outcome indicator variable which is equal to 1 if 
the corresponding observation period ended in a transition to state k, and zero other-
wise.  Furthermore, let  i N be the set of observations available for individual i. The 
contribution to the likelihood function formed by a particular individual, conditional 
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where   { } , it Kw r = when  ja =  and  { } , it Ka r = when  jw = , except in cases where 
work is resumed ( jw = ) after full exhaustion of sickness benefits ( 12) ia d = , in 
which case  { } it Kr = during the subsequent two quarters.   15
We assume that the unobserved heterogeneity vectors are discretely distrib-
uted with W points of support, and estimate these mass points together with their as-
sociated probabilities. In terms of observed variables, the likelihood is then given as  
(8)     
11 11
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where ql is the probability of the particular combination of unobserved variables  l v . 
  Maximisation of (8) constitutes a huge computational task. Since each spell 
sequence is split into several observation periods (in order to avoid restrictions on the 
way spell duration and business cycles affects the hazard rates), each with a separate 
outcome indicator, the total number of observations is extremely large (12,418,185). 
Moreover, the likelihood function is not globally concave, and as more support points 
are added to the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity, it is well known that it be-
comes increasingly difficult to locate the global maximum. In order to solve these 
problems, we have utilised the ‘implicit dummy approach’, which takes into account 
the prior knowledge that many (in practice almost all) calculations involving the 
dummy variables are superfluous (since most of them are equal to zero most of the 
time); see Gaure and Røed (2003). The model was estimated on a supercomputer at 
the High Performance Computing Centre, University of Oslo. A complete list of the 
explanatory variables used in the model is provided in Appendix. 
4  Results 
We estimated separate models for men (5,061,300 observations) and women 
(7,356,885 observations). For men, we found that eight mass-points were required in 
the heterogeneity distribution in order to maximise the likelihood function, while for 
women it sufficed with six points. The total number of parameters to be estimated was 
219 for men and 211 for women. Given this large number of parameters, we do not   16
present complete estimation results, but focus on the parameters of interest. We first 
describe the main pattern of transition probabilities, as they evolve over duration of 
absence –and work-resumption spells (Section 4.1). We then turn to the causal (4.2) 
and the composition (4.3) effects of business cycles. Finally, we present results re-
garding the effects of observed and unobserved heterogeneity (4.4). 
4.1  Overall Transition Rates and the Spell Duration Pattern 
Figure 2 describes the expected progression of absence spells in terms of transition 
rates to work-resumption and rehabilitation/disability. The two upper panels plots the 
estimated duration parameters  ˆ () jkd λ , together with their 95 per cent confidence inter-
vals. The two confidence interval boundaries are not easy to spot, which highlights 
the point that statistical uncertainty is not a major issue in this analysis. Based on the 
point estimates, the two lower panels depict the implied monthly transition probabili-
ties (or grouped hazard rates) for representative entrants into sickness absence
7. The 
probability of resuming work during the course of the first month is 51 per cent for 
men and 47 per cent for women. It then declines monotonically until it reaches a 
trough after 9 months at around 12 per cent. Then, in the last month of the eligibility 
period, it again rises again to 30-35 per cent.  
                                                 
7 Representative entrants are constructed by scaling the first month transition probabilities to the  
average observed transition rates in the first duration month. 
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Figure 2. Estimated spell duration parameters  ˆ () jkd λ with 95 per cent point-wise con-
fidence intervals (upper panels) and predicted monthly transition probabilities for rep-
resentative entrant into absence (lower panels). 
Note: There are confidence intervals around all the profiles in the upper panels, even they are not visi-
ble due to the thickness of the lines. 
 
   The work-resumption peak identified in the last month of the eligibility period 
coincides with the point of benefit exhaustion. It is hard to believe that this has noth-
ing to do with the termination of sickness benefits. Yet, the result must be interpreted 
with care, since, at this point, benefit exhaustion forces some kind of transition. It may 
be the case that attempts to resume work are not really made, or that they fail, such 
that the start of rehabilitation or the take up of disability pension is only delayed for a 
short time period. We return to this issue below.  
The probability of making a transition to disability or rehabilitation is (unsur-
prisingly) negligible during most of the absence spell. However, having reached the 
end of the eligibility period entails a very high probability (above 40 per cent for our 
representative individual) of making that transition. This reflects that persons who at   18
this point are still not able to resume work for health reasons, are entitled to rehabilita-
tion or disability transfers
8. 
  Figure 3 describes the progression of the subsequent work-resumption spells, 
conditional on the duration of the completed absence spell. Note that the time units in 
Figure 3 – as well as the predicted probabilities – are measured on a quarterly basis. 
For persons with short initial absence spells, the probability of making a subsequent 
transition to rehabilitation or disability is close to zero. The probability rises substan-
tially if the sickness benefits were exhausted (or nearly exhausted). In particular, the 
probability of entering into rehabilitation or disability during the first quarter is 
around 35 per cent for persons who exhausted their entire sickness benefit entitle-
ment. The probability of a relapse into sickness typically lies between 5 and 10 per 
cent for each quarter. And this probability is higher the shorter was the initial spell.  In 
particular, it seems that very short spells (only one month) is associated with a rela-
tively high relapse probability. For example, if the initial absence spell lasted three 
months, rather than just one, the relapse hazard is reduced by 6.6% (0.8%) for men 
and as much as 32.4% (0.7%) for women (standard errors in parentheses). The latter 
finding suggests that absence spells to some extent may be viewed as a health invest-
ment, in the sense that having a longer absence spell ‘now’ reduces the probability of 
a relapse in the future.  
                                                 
8 Note that there is not a 100 per cent probability of escaping sickness benefits in the presumed 
final month of the benefit period. This is related to the fact that we do not measure absence duration 
accurately; there are probably some cases in which benefits are exhausted in the 11
th or the 13
th months. 
In the analysis, we interpret the few absence spells lasting more than 12 months as continuing with the 
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Figure 3. Predicted transition probabilities to rehabilitation/disability and relapse into 
absence during first four quarters of work-resumption, for different durations of the 
initial absence spell (calculated for a randomly selected entrant into work resumption 
spell) 
 
  As we pointed out above, transition rates out of absence may give an incom-
plete picture of how the institutional characteristics of the benefit system affects ab-
sence behaviour, since some persons may return to absence soon after an ‘apparent’ 
work-resumption transition or simply move on to rehabilitation or disability. Figure 4 
summarizes the pattern of work-resumption, relapse and disability transitions, com-
bining the processes depicted in Figures 2 and 3 in the form of a joint probability of 
work-resumption and not returning to absence or transit to a rehabilitation/disability 
state within the subsequent 12 months; i.e. the probability of ‘lasting’ work-
resumption. We see that the probability of making this kind of ‘lasting’ transition out 
of the Social Insurance system is substantially lower than the ‘short-term’ probability 
of resuming work. Moreover, the spike in the transition rate around the time of benefit 
exhaustion becomes much less pronounced, implying that a substantial part of the in-  20
crease in the work-resumption rate around the time of benefit exhaustion is short-
lived. This probably reflects that the work behaviour of persons who have experi-
enced a one-year sickness spell is to a large extent determined by purely medical con-
ditions. 



















Figure 4. Predicted monthly probabilities of resuming work with and without condi-
tioning on no relapse or rehabilitation/disability transition in the subsequent 12 
months. 
  
One may still question whether the remaining 12
th month spike represents a 
genuine increase in lasting work-resumption hazards or whether it reflects measure-
ment error in the sense of complete withdrawals from the labour force (without reha-
bilitation –or disability benefits). We have had the opportunity to check that out for 
some cohorts in the dataset. In particular, we selected persons who completed a full 
sickness period of 12 months during the last three months of 1996 and who did not 
take up any form of rehabilitation –or disability benefits during 1997, and investigated 
the distribution of recorded wage income (collected from administrative registers) for   21
this group of persons in 1997. As it turned out, only 8.6 per cent of these persons did 
not have any wage income at all in 1997. An additional fraction of 11.2 per cent 
earned less than 50,000 NOK (6,500 Euro). Comparable numbers for persons who 
completed sickness spells of only six months duration in the same period was 5.0 per 
cent (with zero income) and 17.0 per cent (with positive earnings below 50,000 
NOK). Based on these statistics, we conclude that most of the apparent rise in the last-
ing work-resumption hazard that occurs at the end of the sickness benefit period is 
genuine. 
4.2  The Causal Effects of Business Cycles on Work-Resumption 
Table 2 presents the estimated business cycle effects. The two business cycle indica-
tors are both normalised such that they have unit range, i.e. a positive change in the 
variable of one unit corresponds to a change from the worst state (or largest decline) 
of labour market tightness that was observed during the estimation period to the best 
state (or largest increase). This implies that (exp(parameter estimate)-1), which for 
small values of the parameter estimate is close to the parameter estimate itself, can be 
interpreted as the relative change in the corresponding hazard rate that is predicted to 
occur when the business cycle (or the change in the business cycle) changes from its 
lowest to its highest value. The estimated business cycle effects are in line with our 
prior expectations for both men and women, although they seem to be stronger for 
women. Improvements in the business cycle tend to reduce the work-resumption 
rates, and increase the relapse rates, substantially – both through a level and a differ-
ence effect - suggesting that there is a disciplinary effect associated with poor and de-
teriorating business cycle conditions. The effects of business cycles are both statisti-
cally and substantively significant. For men, we find that when the labour market is 
both tight and tightening, the work-resumption hazard is 15-20 per cent lower – and   22
the relapse hazard 15-20 per cent higher - than when the labour market is both slack 
and slackening. For women, the work-resumption hazard is as much as 25-30 per cent 
higher – and the relapse hazard 25-30 per cent higher – in a tight and tightening la-
bour market (compared to a slack and slackening). As pointed out in Section 1, there 
is also another interpretation of this relationship than that of disciplinary effects, 
namely that the higher work-pressure associated with favourable business cycle con-
ditions makes it more difficult for persons with a fragile health to resume work. Note, 
however, that the selection effects associated with less healthy workers being pulled 
into the labour market cannot explain the parameters presented in Table 2, since we 
condition on the business cycle conditions at the moment of entry into sickness (see 
next subsection).  
Table 2 
Estimated effects of the business cycle at the time of potential transition  
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
 Men  Women 
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The probability of entering into disability or rehabilitation declines quite sub-
stantially in the level of the business cycle, but increases in its difference. One may 
speculate that strain and stress at the workplaces are related to large increases in eco-
nomic activity more than to high activity itself. Hence, it may be more difficult for 
employees with poor health to resume work during times of increasing demand, and, 
as a result, more workers are pushed into rehabilitation or disability.    23
4.3  The Effects of Business Cycles on the Composition of Entrants into Ab-
sence 
Table 3 present the estimated effects of business cycles on the composition of entrants 
into sickness absence. Again, we find that the estimates are in line with prior expecta-
tions. Improvements in the business cycles are clearly associated with more healthy 
entrants into absence spells, with higher work-resumption hazards and lower relapse 
hazards, ceteris paribus. Our results at this point therefore fits well into the discipline 
hypothesis; i.e. that it is more tempting to consider a given medical condition as justi-
fying an absence spell when business cycles are improving than when business cycles 
are deteriorating. However, the level of the business cycle seems to have exactly the 
opposite effect. Persons who become sick during favourable, but stable, business cy-
cle conditions tend to have poor work-resumption prospects and high relapse propen-
sities, ceteris paribus. We interpret this as a confirmation of the ‘selection hypothesis’, 
i.e. that the average health condition among employed workers is negatively related to 
the employment rate.  
Table 3 
Estimated selection effects of the business cycle at the time of entry into absence  
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
 Men  Women 
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4.4  Observed and Unobserved Heterogeneity 
Unsurprisingly, one of the most important characteristics to explain individual hazard 
rates is age. This is illustrated in Figure 5. Work resumption prospects decline mo-
notonously with age, particularly for men. The rehabilitation/disability and relapse   24
hazards increase with age. Again, the age effect is stronger for men than for women. It 
is natural to interpret the differences across age groups as reflecting differences in av-
erage health conditions. The apparently larger effect for men, particularly at high 
ages, is probably related to the fact that older men on average have much longer 
work-careers than women. 
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Figure 5. Estimated relative hazard rates for different age groups (with 95 per cent 
point-wise confidence intervals). 
 
  Educational attainment also has a substantial impact on absence behaviour. 
This is illustrated in Figure 6. The higher is the education, the higher is the work-
resumption probability and the lower is the relapse probability. The latter effect is 
much stronger than the former. It is natural to interpret the relationship between ab-
sence behaviour and education as reflecting two different mechanisms. First, there are 
unobserved differences in health conditions across groups with different educational 
attainment; see e.g. Grossman (2000) for a recent summary of empirical evidence re-
garding this relationship. And, second, there are unobserved differences in the type of   25
work that is performed by the different education groups, with poorly educated work-






































Figure 6. Estimated relative hazard rates for different educational groups (with 95 per 
cent point-wise confidence intervals). 
Note: Educational attainment is grouped as follows: 1=only compulsory education, 2=lower secondary 
school, 3=higher secondary school, vocational subjects, 4=higher secondary school, general subjects, 
5=college, 6=university degree. 
 
We now turn to some results regarding the effects of observed heterogeneity 
that we do not spell out in detail (complete results are available upon request).  For 
both men and women, income just prior to the absence spell (represented in the model 
by seven dummy variables) seems to affect the work-resumption propensity in a u-
shaped pattern, implying that the work resumption hazard is lowest for persons with 
medium incomes. This is mirrored by a hump-shaped pattern in the effect of income 
on the relapse hazard. For men, high income unambiguously and quite strongly re-
duces the probability of entering into rehabilitation or disability. There is a similar, 
but much weaker effect for women. And for women, the effect is not entirely mo-  26
notonous; at very high incomes, there is a tendency for even higher incomes to in-
crease the rehabilitation/disability hazard.  Marital status has a substantive impact on 
absence behaviour, particularly for men. Being married implies a higher work-
resumption hazard, a (slightly) lower rehabilitation/disability hazard and a (substan-
tially) lower relapse hazard. Immigrants from developing countries have a lower 
work-resumption hazard and higher relapse hazard than natives. The latter of these 
effects is quite strong, i.e., compared to natives, the relapse hazard is as much as 60 
per cent higher for immigrant men and 47 per cent higher for immigrant women. The 
rehabilitation/disability hazard is, on the other hand, around 25 per cent lower for 
immigrants than for natives. 
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Figure 7. The estimated seasonal pattern in relative hazard rates (with 95 per cent con-
fidence intervals). 
Notes: Months are numbered from January (1) to December (12). For the quarterly transition probabili-
ties, we use the first calendar month in each (overlapping) quarter, e.g. if the quarter in question is Feb-
ruary, March and April, we attribute the February-parameter to this observation. 
   27
We also estimated seasonal effects in the various transition rates. The result is 
illustrated in Figure 7. There is a strong seasonal pattern in work resumption and re-
lapse hazards, particularly for women. While the work-resumption hazards are highest 
during the summer, the relapse hazards are highest during the winter.  
  The estimated mass-point distribution of unobserved heterogeneity is not di-
rectly interpretable, since different combinations of mass-points and probabilities 
sometimes yield (almost) equivalent results. Our experience suggests, however, that 
the first and second order moments of the heterogeneity distribution are relatively ro-
bust. Hence, in Table 4, we report the imputed correlation coefficients. They reveal 
essentially the same correlation structure for men and women, and suggest that there 
is a negative correlation between unobservables that affect the work-resumption pro-
pensity, on the one hand, and the rehabilitation/disability and relapse propensities, on 
the other. There is a positive correlation between unobservables affecting rehabilita-
tion/disability propensity and relapse propensity. 
Table 4 
Estimated correlation coefficients for unobserved characteristics, based on 8 mass-points in the 
male heterogeneity distribution and six mass-points in the female heterogeneity distribution  
(exp( ),exp( )),  jk corr v v k j ≠  
 Men  Women 
   Rehabilitation 
Disability 
Relapse   Rehabilitation 
Disability 
Relapse 
Work-resumption   -0.204  -0.365    -0.263  -0.600 
Rehabilitation/Disability    0.243      0.298 
  
5  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have investigated the transition rate pattern out of sickness absence 
spells, on the basis of Norwegian register data containing more than two million ab-
sence spells distributed over a period of eight years.  A main objective has been to 
take advantage of the huge dataset to avoid unjustified restrictions on the way ob-  28
served, as well as unobserved, heterogeneity affect the transition rates. For this pur-
pose, we have set up and estimated a dependent competing risks transition rate model 
for direct transitions into work-resumption and rehabilitation/disability, as well as for 
delayed transitions into rehabilitation/disability and relapses into sickness absence. 
  Our main conclusions are as follows:  
i)  Business cycle conditions have substantial effects on work-
resumption behaviour. Favourable business cycle developments 
during the progression of absence spells imply lower work-
resumption rates and higher relapse rates (even when the business 
cycle conditions at the moment of entry are controlled for). These 
effects are both statistically and substantively significant, and 
stronger for women than for men. 
ii)  Institutional features of the health-insurance system also matter for 
work-resumption behaviour. In particular, we find that the work-
resumption propensity increases around the time of full benefit ex-
haustion after one year of absence. A large part of this increase is 
subsequently diluted, however, through higher relapse and disability 
rates. Hence, economic factors seem to have a significant, but lim-
ited effect on work behaviour at this late stage of absence spells. 
iii)  There is substantial degree of heterogeneity in individuals’ work-
resumption prospects. The most important explanatory variables are 
age and educational attainment. Higher age implies, ceteris paribus, 
lower work-resumption probabilities, higher relapse probabilities, 
and higher rehabilitation/disability probabilities. Higher education   29
implies higher work-resumption rates and (in particular) lower re-
lapse rates. 
These observations can hardly be translated directly into policy-
recommendations regarding the design of public sickness insurance schemes. One 
important lesson, however, is that sickness absence is not a pure medical phenomenon 
that can be treated as completely independent of the workers’ preferences, work ethics 
and incentives. And the fact that workers seem to adjust their absence behaviour ac-
cording to the economic incentives they face implies that governments have to cope 
with a moral hazard dilemma. Our results leave little doubt that a thriftier health in-
surance scheme could contribute to a reduction of sickness absence in Norway. How-
ever, the potential gain in terms of reduced ‘unnecessary’ sickness absence has to be 
traded off against the possible promotion of sickness ‘presenteeism’ and the cost of 
increased uncertainty and inequality (associated with less than full insurance). More-
over, we have found that there is a cost associated with taking up work too quickly, in 
the sense that this increases the relapse probability later on. Hence, a longer spell of 
absence may in some cases be considered a health investment. Liquidity constrained 
individuals may not be able to make this investment on their own. 
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Appendix: List of Explanatory Variables 
The following variables were included in estimation of the destination specific hazard 
rates: 
Transitions to work resumption 
Age: 9 dummy variables (<20, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-59) 
Income: 7 dummy variables 
Region: 6 dummy variables 
Duration of ongoing absence spell: 12 dummy variables 
Season of ongoing absence spell: 12 dummy variables 
Sickness degree: 4 dummy variables (<50%, 50-70%, 71-99%, 100%)   32
Educational attainment: 7 dummy variables 
Business cycle indicator in potential transition month: 1 scalar variable 
Change in business cycle indicator from the last to the current potential transition month: 1 scalar vari-
able 
Business cycle indicator in the month of entry into the spell sequence: 1 scalar variable 
Change in business cycle indicator from the month before entry to the month of entry into the spell 
sequence: 1 scalar variable 
Marital status: 1 dummy variable 
Non-Western immigrant: 1 dummy variable 
 
Transitions to rehabilitation/disability 
Age: 9 dummy variables (<20, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-59) 
Income: 7 dummy variables 
Region: 6 dummy variables 
Indicator for completed absence spell (work resumed): 1 dummy variable 
Duration of ongoing absence spell for still active absence spells: 12 dummy variables  
Duration of completed absence spell for completed absence spells: 12 dummy variables  
Duration of ongoing work-resumption spell for active work-resumption spells: 4 dummy variables 
Indicator variable for having completed an absence spell lasting 12 months (i.e. exhausted benefits) and 
being in the second quarter of ongoing work-resumption spell 
Indicator variable for having completed an absence spell lasting 12 months (i.e. exhausted benefits) and 
being in the third or fourth quarter of ongoing work-resumption spell 
Season of ongoing absence or work-resumption spell: 12 dummy variables 
Sickness degree: 4 dummy variables (<50%, 50-70%, 71-99%, 100%) 
Educational attainment: 7 dummy variables 
Business cycle indicator in potential transition month or in the first month of the potential transition 
quarter (for work-resumption spells): 1 scalar variable 
Change in business cycle indicator from the last to the current potential transition month or to the first 
month of the potential transition quarter (for work-resumption spells): 1 scalar variable 
Business cycle indicator in the month of entry into the spell sequence: 1 scalar variable 
Change in business cycle indicator from the month before entry to the month of entry into the spell 
sequence: 1 scalar variable 
Marital status: 1 dummy variable 
Non-Western immigrant: 1 dummy variable 
 
Transitions to relapse (a new sickness spell after work is resumed) 
Age: 9 dummy variables (<20, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-59) 
Income: 7 dummy variables 
Region: 6 dummy variables 
Duration of completed absence spell: 12 dummy variables  
Duration of ongoing work-resumption spell: 4 dummy variables 
Season of ongoing absence or work-resumption spell: 12 dummy variables 
Sickness degree: 4 dummy variables (<50%, 50-70%, 71-99%, 100%) 
Educational attainment: 7 dummy variables 
Business cycle indicator in the first month of the potential transition quarter: 1 scalar variable 
Change in business cycle indicator from the last to the first month of the potential transition quarter: 1 
scalar variable 
Business cycle indicator in the month of entry into the spell sequence: 1 scalar variable 
Change in business cycle indicator from the month before entry to the month of entry into the spell 
sequence: 1 scalar variable 
Marital status: 1 dummy variable 
Non-Western immigrant: 1 dummy variable 
 